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Abstract—The paper presents arithmetic level protections for
ECC processor against some side channel attacks. The proposed
protection is based on random recodings of the secret key in the
double base number system (DBNS). DBNS is a highly redundant
and sparse number system. Here, the high redundancy level
of DBNS is used to randomly modify on-the-ﬂy the ki digits
during the scalar multiplication [k]P . The proposed solution
leads to random numbers and orders of curve level operations
(point addition, doubling and tripling) during the computation
of [k]P operations. Our random recoding method provides
[k]P computation time comparable to the best w-NAF recoding
methods. But standard w-NAF recodings are deterministic ones
while our solution is a random one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Implementation of embedded cryptosystems has to face two
types of attacks: theoretical attacks and physical attacks. The
security against theoretical attacks is provided by the robust-
ness of the mathematical problem behind the cryptosystem:
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [1]. The security of the
cryptosystem against physical attacks, which are considered
as very strong threats in embedded security applications,
should be provided by cryptosystem designers. Recently, very
efﬁcient side channel attacks (SCA) have been proposed such
as power analysis [2] or electromagnetic radiations analysis.
Many countermeasures have been introduced to protect
cryptosystems against some SCAs. Some methods have
been proposed at the arithmetic level. For instance, addition
chains [3], [4] allow to perform only one type of operation,
point additions, during the scalar multiplication [k]P . Hence,
addition chains prevent from some attacks based on simple
power analysis (SPA).
In this paper, we propose on-the-ﬂy random recodings of the
scalar digits ki using the double base number system (DBNS).
The very high redundancy level of DBNS allows to randomly
choose among several representations of the key digits ki.
Then the number and order of operations at the curve level
(point addition, doubling and tripling) is randomized. This
may prevent from some power or electromagnetic radiations
attacks.
Notations and background on ECC and DBNS are provided
in Sections II and III respectively. The proposed countermea-
sure method is described in Section V. Implementation details
in FPGA and experimental results are reported in Sections VI
and VII respectively.
II. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY (ECC)
A complete presentation of ECC systems in presented in [1].
In this work, we use elliptic curves deﬁned over the prime
ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp. Arithmetic operations in Fp are performed
modulo p a large (160–600 bits) prime number. Extension
to ECC systems deﬁned over the F2m ﬁnite ﬁeld is simple.
See [5] for ﬁnite ﬁelds basic theory and applications and [1,
sec. 5.2] for hardware implementations of ﬁnite ﬁeld arith-
metic. An elliptic curve E over Fp is deﬁned by the simpliﬁed
Weierstrass equation (see [1, p. 78]):
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b,
where (x, y) ∈ F2p are the coordinates of point P on E, the
curve parameters a and b, in Fp, are such that 4a2+27b2 = 0.
The addition (ADD) of two points P = (x1, y1) and Q =
(x2, y2) of E gives a third point R = (x3, y3) also on E (the
sum point R = P + Q). The computation of R coordinates
involves arithmetic operations in Fp. See [1, see p. 80] for
a geometrical illustration. The addition of P + P is called
point doubling 2P (DBL), and is computed using a slightly
algorithm. Point tripling 3P (TPL) can also be deﬁned in order
to speed up the scalar multiplication process.
In ECC protocols, the main operation is the scalar multi-
plication [k]P = P + P + · · · + P (with k − 1 additions)
where k is a given integer (the secret/public key) and P
a point on the curve E. The scalar k is a t-bit integer,
k = (kt−1, . . . , k1, k0)2. There are several algorithms for
scalar multiplication (see [1, sec. 3.3]). Figure 1 presents the
simplest [k]P algorithm.
The theoretical security of ECDLP comes from the fact that
given two points P and Q such that Q = [k]P , ﬁnding the
integer k is not feasible in practice (for well chosen curves),
see [1, sec. 4.1] for details and theoretical attacks.
Side channel attacks allow to extract secret informations
from running devices by measuring and analyzing some phys-
ical parameters (power consumption, electromagnetic radia-
tions, computation time). For instance, recording and analyz-
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INPUT: k = (kt−1, . . . , k1, k0)2 and P ∈ E
OUTPUT: Q = [k]P
1: Q ← ∞
2: for i from 0 to t− 1 do
3: if ki = 1 then Q ← Q+ P (ADD)
4: P ← 2P (DBL)
5: return Q
Fig. 1. Right to left version of the double-and-add algorithm computing the
scalar multiplication Q = [k]P (from [1, p. 96]).
ing the instantaneous power consumption of a circuit may
lead to very efﬁcient power attacks [2]. Simple power analysis
(SPA, see [2, chap. 5]) directly uses the fact that basic imple-
mentations of point addition and point doubling operations
have different power traces. In the algorithm presented in
Fig. 1, the point addition operation Q ← Q + P is only
performed for odd bits of the scalar. Thus, the recorded power
traces will directly show where/when are the ADD operations
in the sequence of DBL ones. Algorithms such as the double-
and-add method are prone to this type of attacks.
III. DOUBLE BASE NUMBER SYSTEM (DBNS)
The double base number system (DBNS) simultaneously
uses two bases for representing numbers [6]. In this work, we
use bases 2 and 3. The integer x is represented by:
x =
n−1∑
i=0
si2
ai3bi ,
where si ∈ {−1, 1} and (ai, bi) ∈ N+. Triplets (si, ai, bi)
are called {2, 3}-terms and are the “digits” of the DBNS
representation. DBNS is a sparse (i.e. the number of {2, 3}-
terms is small) and very redundant (i.e. some numbers have
several representations) number system. For instance, the value
127 has 783 different DBNS representations (from [7]):
127 = 2233 + 2132 + 2030
= 2233 + 2430 + 2031
= 2332 + 2133 + 2030
= · · ·
Most of arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, di-
vision) are very complex and costly in DBNS. But there are a
few very cheap operations: multiplication by 2 and 3. Those
operations are very useful in ECC.
As suggested in [8], we use k recoded using DBNS chains
to perform the scalar multiplication operation [k]P . As stated
in [8], the scalar multiplication is efﬁciently computed using
DBNS representations with decreasing exponents1:
a0 ≥ · · · ≥ an−1 and b0 ≥ · · · ≥ bn−1.
1a0 is considered the largest exponent of powers of 2, while an−1 is the
smallest one (the same notation applies for bi exponents of powers of 3).
Let ti = 2ai3bi , using a decreasing sequence of exponents,
the value k =
∑n−1
i=0 ti can be factorized by tn−1:
k =
(
n−2∑
i=0
sit
′
i + sn−1
)
× tn−1,
where t′i = 2
ai−an−13bi−bn−1 . This recursive factorization is
similar to the Horner scheme.
For instance, k = 15679 can be recoded in DBNS with and
without decreasing exponents:
15679 = 2635 + 2233 + 2132 + 2030
= 2132
(
2131
(
2432 + 1
)
+ 1
)
+ 1
Without decreasing exponents, the computation cost of
[15679]P is 3 · ADD + 9 · DBL + 10 · TPL operations while
with decreasing exponents this cost reduces to only 3 · ADD+
6 · DBL+ 5 · TPL operations.
In [8], a scalar multiplication algorithm dedicated to DBNS
representation with decreasing exponents is proposed. This
algorithm is given in Fig. 2. The cost of this algorithm is
(n− 1) · ADD+ a0 · DBL+ b0 · TPL operations.
INPUT: k =
∑n−1
i=0 si2
ai3bi and P ∈ E
OUTPUT: Q = [k]P
1: Q ← s0P
2: for i from 0 to n− 2 do
3: u ← ai − ai+1, v ← bi − bi+1
4: Q ← [2u]Q, Q ← [3v]Q
5: Q ← Q+ si+1P
6: Q ← [2an−1 ]Q, Q ← [3bn−1 ]Q
7: return Q
Fig. 2. Right to left scalar multiplication algorithm [k]P with k represented
in DBNS with decreasing exponents (from [8]).
If the last exponents of powers of 2 and 3 (respectively an−1
and bn−1) are equal to 0 then line 6 must not be executed.
IV. TRUE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR (TRNG)
TRNGs use a physical noise source such as radioactive
decay, meta-stability, thermal noise or jitter variations in free
running oscillators, to produce a random signal. Here, we
use in-house TRNGs with on-line randomness monitoring to
provide the random bits required for the selection of DBNS
recoding rules. This kind of TRNG is based on oscillators
sampling for the noise source (random jitter produced by one
or several free running oscillators). See [9], [10] for details.
V. PROPOSED ARITHMETIC COUNTERMEASURE
During the scalar multiplication [k]P , the point level oper-
ations (i.e. ADD and DBL) are scheduled in a deterministic way
based on k digits. NAF or w-NAF standard recodings produce
deterministic schedules (see [1, p. 98]).
In this work, we use random representations of k in DBNS.
This is possible because the DBNS representation is extremely
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redundant. The conversion from the standard binary represen-
tation to DBNS is done on-the-ﬂy. Then random recodings of
are applied using the following identities:
I1 : 1 + 2 = 3
I2 : 1 + 3 = 2
2
I3 : 1 + 2
3 = 32
I4 : 1 + 1 = 2
Those identities can be applied in two different ways: one
can reduce (e.g. 1+2 → 3) or expand (e.g. 3 → 1+2) DBNS
terms. Reduction of the number of DBNS terms may increase
the [k]P computation speed due to the fact that it reduces the
number of point-level operations. However if the number of
{2, 3}-terms is too small, reduction rules based on the previous
identities may not be applied.
Expansions of DBNS terms may introduce more random-
ness in the recoded scalar k representation, and consequently
in the power traces. There should be a trade-off between the
computation time and the amount of randomness introduced
by expansions.
Furthermore, the previous identities can be combined with
signed digits version of the DBNS representation. Thus there
are two recoding rules for each identity:
I1 ⇒
{
2i+13j−1 + 2i3j−1 = 2i3j R1
2i−13j+1 − 2i−13j = 2i3j R2
I2 ⇒
{
2i−23j+1 + 2i−23j = 2i3j R3
2i+23j−1 − 2i3j−1 = 2i3j R4
I3 ⇒
{
2i+33j−2 + 2i3j−2 = 2i3j R5
2i−33j+2 − 2i−33j = 2i3j R6
I4 ⇒
{
2i−13j + 2i−13j = 2i3j R7
2i+13j − 2i3j = 2i3j R8
Figure 3 illustrates some examples of DBNS recodings for
the scalar k = 140400.
In some cases, some rules cannot be applied due to neigh-
boring {2, 3}-terms. For instance, if two consecutive terms,
ki = (si, ai, bi) and ki−1 = (si−1, ai−1, bi−1), share the same
exponent of the power of 2, i.e. ai = ai−1, then reductions
based on rule R1 cannot be applied.
Even for expansions, some problems may occur due to the
fact that the sequence of exponents must be kept decreasing. In
order to always ensure that the rules produce only decreasing
sequences of exponents, three consecutive {2, 3}-terms must
be read for each rule application.
Below we provide a complete example of a situation where
some rules should be discarded.
We use the k value presented in example Fig. 3. Starting
with the initial DBNS representation k = 140400 = 2737 −
2736 − 2735 − 2635 + 2433 (which is recoding 7 in Fig. 3),
one may think that the reduction 2736+2735 R3−−→ 2935 can be
applied. But for this speciﬁc value of k, this reduction would
produce a non-decreasing sequence of exponents. Indeed the
new recoded DBNS representation would be 2737 − 2935 −
2635 + 2433 which is not a decreasing exponents sequence
of {2, 3}-terms. This last DBNS representation would give
the following computation sequence 2434(2231(2130(−2230+
2031)− 1) + 1).
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 4 presents the architecture of the implemented re-
coding unit. This unit on-the-ﬂy recodes the scalar k using
randomly chosen DBNS representations. The scalar k, repre-
sented in DBNS, is stored in a speciﬁc register as a sequence
of {2, 3}-terms (si, ai, bi). Two speciﬁc blocks check which
rules, R1 to R8, can be applied. One block is dedicated to
reductions and the other one to expansions. Both blocks take
three consecutive {2, 3}-terms as inputs. Using 3 random bits
produced by a TRNG, one rule is randomly selected among the
set of allowed rules and then applied. Once a rule is selected,
the block checks if the application of rules produces a valid
sequence of exponents.
In case of a reduction, one of the original two terms is
modiﬁed accordingly to the selected rule (addition/subtraction
on the exponents and sign adjustment), while the other term
is deleted from the DBNS representation. In case of an
expansion, the block checks that inserting a new term still
lead to decreasing sequence of exponents.
Fig. 4. Architecture of on-the-ﬂy recoding unit with random DBNS
representations.
The proposed recoding unit has been described in VHDL
and implemented in a XC5VLX50T FPGA using the ISE
version 11.4 design environment from Xilinx. The results
reported in Table I have been obtained with standard efforts
for both synthesis and place-and-route steps. The area required
by the recoding unit is very small compared to the total area
of the complete ECC processor. The recoding unit can work at
a clock frequency greater than 200MHz which is faster than
the clock frequency of our arithmetic units in Fp.
block # registers # LUTs max. freq. [MHz]
expansion 93 352 283.5
reduction 26 101 234.6
TABLE I
IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF THE RECODING UNIT ON A XC5VLX50T
FPGA (WITH 28 800 REGISTERS AND 28 800 LUTS).
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1 2836 − 2636 + 2433
2 2637 + 2433 3 2737 − 2736 − 2636 + 2433
red. R4
exp. R2
4 2736 + 2636 + 2433
exp. R1
5 2637 + 2632 − 2432
exp. R4
6 2737 − 2637 + 2433
red. R1
7 2737 − 2736 − 2735 − 2635 + 2433
exp. R1
1
2
3
4
5 6
7
8
[140400]P = [2433]([2232]([2230]P − P ) + P )
= [2432]([2230]([2035]P + P )− P )
= [2433]([2233]([2130]P + P ) + P )
= [2433]([2234]([2130]P − P ) + P )
[140400]P = [2433]([2232]([2130]([2031]([2031]P − P )− P )− P ) + P )
= [2333]([2031]([2332]([2230]P − P ) + P )− P )
= [2433]([2034]([2031]P + P ) + P )
reduction expansion
Fig. 3. Examples of some possible DBNS recodings for k = 140400.
VII. VALIDATION AND COMPARISON
In order to mathematically validate our method, we used
comparisons to software results provided by PARI/GP which is
a computer algebra system with many powerful number theory
functions. We have used the software environment developed
for the mathematical validation to experimentally evaluate
the computation time using the proposed random recoding
method. All obtained results have been compared to standard
recoding methods (NAF, w-NAF see [1, p. 98]).
The experiments reported below have been realized using
the curve P-224 provided by NIST (FIPS 186-2), see [1,
appendix A.2.1] for details. The prime ﬁeld Fp is deﬁned with
p = p224 = 2
224−296+1. There exists many ways to represent
points of an elliptic curve. We use Jacobian coordinates
(denoted J ) in order to speed up the [k]P computation (see [1,
sec. 3.2.1]). We also use mixed coordinates Jacobian with
afﬁne ones (denoted A). Table II summarizes the cost of the
main elliptic curve operations (see [7] for details). ADDJ+A is
the cost of point addition in mixed coordinates (J +A → J ).
x−DBLJ and x−TPLJ are respectively the cost of x doubling
operations and x tripling operations when Jacobian coordinates
are used.
curve operation cost
ADDJ+A 8 · M+ 3 · S
x− DBLJ 4x · M+ (4x+ 2) · S
x− TPLJ (11x− 1) · M+ (4x+ 2) · S
TABLE II
COST OF ELLIPTIC CURVE OPERATIONS IN JACOBIAN COORDINATES FOR
CURVES DEFINED OVER Fp (FROM [7]).
The experimental setup was as follows. 1000 scalars k have
been randomly chosen in the range 2log2p−1 < k < p − 1.
So k = (1, kn−2, . . . , k1, k0).
For each scalar k, the binary representation of k is converted
to DBNS using the algorithm provided in [11]. Then 10 000
random recodings are applied to k in DBNS. For each recoded
DBNS sequence, the number of curve level operations (ADD,
DBL, TPL) is recorded. The number of times expansion and
reduction rules can be applied are also recorded.
Table III presents the obtained statistics for 1000 scalars
k and 10 000 random recodings for each scalar. The average
value and the standard deviation of number of times each rule
can applied are reported for reductions and for expansions.
Rules R7 and R8 are the most often used rules both for
reduction and expansion. Note that given three successive
{2, 3}-terms, in 6.7% of cases no rule can be applied for
those three terms.
The average length of the obtained DBNS expansion is
65.5 {2, 3}-terms with a standard deviation equal to 4.1. The
maximal exponent of powers of 2 and 3 are 112 and 71
respectively. Then the average cost for computing [k]P using
the random DBNS recoding is
65.5 · ADD+ 112 · DBL+ 71 · TPL.
We compared the [k]P computation cost using our random
DBNS recoding to the results based on standard methods.
The corresponding results are reported in Table IV where
M and S are respectively the cost of one multiplication and
one square in Fp. We use the standard cost approximation
S ≈ 0.8·M. The reported results show that our solution provide
[k]P operations a computation time similar to state-of-the-art
4-NAF recoding method but with the advantage of having a
randomized behavior.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, preliminary results for arithmetic level protec-
tions against some side channel attacks are reported. The pro-
posed countermeasure uses random and on-the-ﬂy recodings
of the secret key k in DBNS during the scalar multiplication
[k]P . Starting from a scalar k, our method randomly provides
different DBNS representations of the recoded scalar k. Then
the number and the order of point level operations (addition,
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rules R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8
avg. 594.4 750.3 544.1 450.0 157.5 166.8 975.9 1010.9
reductions std. dev. 48.5 81.0 62.8 46.9 34.9 38.3 67.8 86.6
avg. [%] 12.8 16.1 11.7 9.7 3.4 3.6 21.0 21.7
avg. 561.8 743.0 537.4 437.8 150.6 163.2 1039.2 1031.8
expansions std. dev. 45.4 82.3 62.8 47.4 34.3 37.3 71.8 88.6
avg. [%] 12.0 15.9 11.5 9.4 3.2 3.5 22.3 22.1
TABLE III
EXPERIMENT RESULTS FOR THE NUMBER OF TIMES EACH RULE CAN BE APPLIED.
method total cost approx. cost
NAF 1500 · M+ 1575 · S ≈ 2760 · M
3-NAF 1354 · M+ 1524 · S ≈ 2573 · M
4-NAF 1284 · M+ 1494 · S ≈ 2479 · M
DBNS recoding 1752 · M+ 930 · S ≈ 2496 · M
TABLE IV
COST COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED METHOD FOR THE COMPUTATION
OF [k]P TO STANDARD METHODS.
doubling and tripling) is randomized during the scalar multi-
plication [k]P .
An on-the-ﬂy recoding unit in DBNS has been implemented
in FPGA. The cost of this unit is very small compared to
the total cost of a complete ECC processor both for clock
frequency and silicon area aspects. Our countermeasure pro-
vides randomized scalar multiplications at the speed of the
best unprotected algorithms.
In the future, we plan to integrate this protection scheme
into an ECC processor under development and experimentally
evaluate its robustness using power attacks. We also plan to
work on other recoding identities and rules such as 22 + 2 =
32 − 3.
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